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Abstract  
The key purpose of this research paper is to explore the moderating effect of Corporate 
Governance on the relationship between accounting base financial performance i.e. ROA, and 
ROE and Capital Structure of 173 Manufacturing firms listed in KSE of Pakistan for the period of 
2009 to 2014. In this study multiple regression method is used under fixed effect regression 
model approach on panel data. The empirical results show that the inclusion of Corporate 
Governance Index (CGI) as moderating variable has influenced the interaction between Capital 
Structure and Financial Performance, which is positively significant. The result is generally found 
that the most of Pakistani manufacturing listed firms pursue good corporate governance 
mechanism and use good and optimal level of Capital Mix to get the better and high financial 
performance. Furthermore, the corporate governance sub-indices i.e. board structure (BOD-I) 
and transparency & disclosure (DISC-III) both also have positive and statistically significant 
association with both firms performance variables: ROA and ROE. Moreover, the ownership 
structure sub-index (OWS-II) has not significant influence on financial performance. In last, the 
capital structure also has positive relationship with financial performance, interestingly about 70 
per cent of Capital is financed by Equity capital and the Debt capital signifies 30 per cent only. 
The core significance of this paper is to investigate the impact of Corporate Governance practices 
on financial decisions from the Pakistani perspective. 
Key words: Corporate Governance Index, Capital Structure, Financial performance, 
Manufacturing Sector. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance is basically involves in fare balancing of interests of the corporate investors and 
stakeholders in a corporation. It is a method of leading the firms to cut down their principal and agent 
conflict, escalate the investor’s confidence, firm goodwill, shareholders wealth and investment 
opportunities. It also provides the right direction to the firms that how the firms should work and be 
supervised.  
Heretofore, most of studies have been explored the effect of Capital Structure on firm performance but the 
effect of Corporate Governance (CG) on financial decisions and firm Performance has received slight 
consideration in Pakistan. The purpose of this research is to scrutinize the relationship between leverage 
levels and firm performance with moderating impact of corporate governance practices of listed 
manufacturing firms of Pakistan. Mostly, the previous literature shows the positive association between 
corporate governance characteristics and capital mix. (Abor 2007) Stated the significant and positive 
connection between Corporate Governance practices (CG) and financial decisions. Furthermore, the firms 
having a good corporate Governance Practices has more chances to get debt financing then those have 
not implement the good corporate governance practices, such firm are able to pay off their dues, interest 
and debt on time. On the other hand, (Butt and Hasan 2009) found the negative association between 
Corporate Governance Indicators i.e. board size & managerial shareholding and capital structure. 
Corporate Governance & its Importance 
The main task of the Corporate Governance (CG) is to handle all the stakeholders those have controlling 
influence in a firm such as shareholders, suppliers, and creditors (Johnson, Boone et al. 2000). Moreover, 
sound and effective corporate governance (CG) practices brings imperative growth in the financial market 
by increasing shareholders self-confidence and appropriate administration of the portfolio investments. 
(Mitton 2004) Mentioned that good Corporate Governance (CG) practices have greater dividend payout 
(DPS) ratio and better for rights protection for all stakeholders.  
Corporate Governance helpful for society welfare since it is not only relevant to the business activities. It is 
also grateful for the development of economy of any country. Nowadays, firms have established a new 
concept / approach such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Corporate Governance has substantial 
and positive impact on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting (Khan 2010) & (Sharif and Rashid 
2014). Moreover the results also found that corporate social responsibility (CSR) has significant and 
negative association with the corporate governance element: Foreign Directors (Sharif and Rashid 2014). 
Capital Structure & its Importance 
Financial Decisions are crucial, fundamental and much important for any business in all around the world. 
Capital Structure is the mixture of short term and long term debt. Financial decision about capital structure 
provides the clear direction to firm financies for overall operations and growth to achieve the organizational 
goals by using numerous financial resources. (Bokpin and Arko 2009) indicate that the financial decision is 
important because such decision has organizational power to deal with competitive environment. (Saeed, 
Gull et al. 2013) mentioned that it is very hard to made a decision about capital structure of the firm. 
Financial managers are challenging many complications for setting the best possible and optimal capital 
structure to maximize the organization value and minimize the cost of investment. Financial decisions are 
affected due to different factors such as Financial Planning, Trade Risk, Company’s Tax Exposure, 
condition of stock market, Cost of Debt, political environment, Business Operational risk, Financial Risk and 
regulatory and governing framework. 
 
Corporate Governance & Financial Performance 
Corporate Governance rules, regulations, policies and mechanism have great impact on the company 
performance. It also takes the perfection in the firm cash flows that is shared among stakeholders (Black, 
Jang et al. 2006). The results display significant and positive relationship between index of CG 
characteristics and firm performance and negative association between the market valuation and index of 
corporate governance practices. Moreover, the results also point out that audit committee and board of 
directors were positively linked with firm performance but negative relationship between audit committee 
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and market valuation (Munisi and Randøy 2013). The internal corporate governance practices index have 
negative impact on the bank financial performance (Dedu and Chitan 2013).  
An Overview of Corporate Governance In Pakistan.  
Currently, the understanding about the significance of Corporate Governance practices is growing in 
Pakistan. A lot of work has been done by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) for the 
development of Corporate Governance code 2012. The SECP make the regulatory framework and build 
the rules, regulations and standards for firms. In Pakistan the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan is the main regulator while the state bank of Pakistan (SBP) is the secondary. Moreover, 
“Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG)” an institute of Corporate Governance has formed by 
the Government of Pakistan for the implementation of good Corporate Governance practices, 
accountability standards and balance demonstration through code of Corporate Governance 2012.  
The Key components of Corporate Governance described in Corporate Governance Code 2012 are: 
 Board Size 
 Audit related committee 
 Disclosure of financial statements 
 Ownership structure 
 CEO Duality 
 Directors’ remuneration 
 CEO Remuneration 
 
Importance of Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan 
Unquestionably, manufacturing sector is most important and key sector of Pakistan with multi-dimensional 
activities of several sub sectors, surprisingly, its contribution to Pakistan exports is about 75%. It provides a 
vital contribution to the Pakistan Gross Domestic product (GDP), accounts for 13.4 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product. Moreover, large scale manufacturing leading to the whole sector with 10.6 percent of 
GDP. According to Pakistan economic survey 2014-2015 the major buyers of textile products include UK, 
Hong Kong, USA, France China, South Korea, Japan, Turkey and Bangladesh. But due to competitive 
pressure there is much need to improve our policies, strategies for reformation and growth in 
manufacturing sector. All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA) is working as a trade association of 
firms. 
 
                Figure 1: Pie Chart of Listed Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan 
Total number of listed firms in manufacturing sectors are 378 with 14 sub-sectors, food product and 
construction & cement have 14% &10% contribution to manufacturing  respectively, while the remaining 
other sub sectors having slight contribution about less then 10% each, with the exception of textile sectors 
having 180 firms (47% of total manufacturing sector). 
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Research Problem 
Corporate Governance practices effectiveness level in developing countries is under discussion since last 
fifteen years and these developing and emerging countries markets are looking for appropriate Corporate 
Governance Mechanism. Poor Corporate Governance does not only lead to the risky financing, poor 
performance, but also cause for macroeconomics crises (Claessens, Djankov et al. 2002), like as1997 East 
Asia Crises. The relative poor performance of the corporate governance in the Asian market made the 
corporate governance a slogan in the development planning for developing countries, of which Pakistan is 
no exception (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999). In Pakistan large shareholders have the majority of control 
over the financials decisions such dominance of large shareholders effect the financials decisions of firms. 
The present study is to providing better grounds in this respect. In order to examine the moderating role of 
Corporate Governance Practices on the interaction between Firm Performance and Capital Structure 
multiple regression model is used. This study tries to explore the importance of Corporate Governance in 
Pakistan and how the good corporate governance practices effect the financial performance and financing 
decisions of manufacturing firms of pakistan. 
Literature Review 
Plenty of research has been conducted to measure the effect of Capital Structure on Financial 
Performance and impact of Corporate Governance (CG) Practices on company performance. Results of 
various studies show the different outcomes. (Abor 2007) indicate the positive relationship between 
Corporate Governance (CG) and leverage. Furthermore, the firms having a good Corporate Governance 
Practices has more chances to get debt financing then those have not implement the good corporate 
governance practices, such firm are able to pay off their dues, interest and debt on time.  
(Mitton 2004) mentioned that good Corporate Governance (CG) practices have greater dividend payout 
(DPS) ratio and better for rights protection all stakeholders. Corporate Governance has significant and 
positive influence on CSR reporting. Moreover the results also found that corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) has significant and negative association with the corporate governance element: Foreign Directors 
(Sharif and Rashid 2014). Furthermore (Munisi and Randøy 2013) found that a significant and positive link 
between CGI and financial performance. 
It was mentioned by (Liu 2006) that board is the vital element of corporate governance which has the 
power to effect on the management planning. Board size have positive influence on firm performance 
measures. It has positive and significant association with debt ratios (Kyereboah‐coleman and Biekpe 
2006). The board of director (BOD) is the top decision making authority of an organization. Board size and 
capital structure have positive and significant association and such relationship lead to better financial 
decision (Bokpin and Arko 2009). Board is an important indicator of corporate governance in term meaning 
of performance and boad size has positive association with the corporation performacne (Cheng 2008) 
while (Lee and Lee 2009) argue that board size has negative association with the value of corporation. 
According to (Gill and Biger 2013) large board size have not positively linked with manufacturing firms and 
not helpful to improve the efficiency of working capital management.  
The outside directors have more insight knowledge and experience as compare to dependent director in 
any organization so they do not only lead to any organization, they also can influence the corporate 
governance practices, mechanism and system. (Peasnell, Pope et al. 2005) indicate that firms which hire 
independent outside directors and Non-Executive director have greater benefit in the market as compared 
to firms that don’t employ Non Executive or independent outside directors. (Dunn 2004) found a positive 
and statistically significant link between independent directors and financial performance. The appointment 
of outside directors increase the firm financial performance as  board members are not well known to the 
corporate governance mechanism (Bokpin and Arko 2009). The firms which have large percentage of 
independent director are more beneficial (Su and He 2012). Firms those have less number of outside 
directors have less proportion of leverage (Abor 2007). 
A firm have different types of employees: Executive and non-Executive employees. The executive 
employees are those employees which have gross salary more than five lac rupees in the year. The 
corporate governance code 2012 put the restriction on the proportion of the Executive Directors, according 
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to this the size of Executive Director must not be more than the 75% of the total board members. Moreover, 
the Executive members also retain the shares of the firm that should be reported in the categories of 
shareholdings in the annual report.  (Khan 2010) mentioned the negative relationship between the 
existence of executive directors and CSR (Corporate Social Responsivity). 
Duality means dual characteristics of a person, when a same person is working as chairman and Chief 
Executive officer of a company this is known as CEO duality. The CEO duality also effecting the financial 
decisions and lead to the agency problems. So it is advised that dual characteristics of a person should not 
be in the favor of the firms. But, diverse and mixed outcomes have been reported by various researchers 
relating to this matter. Firms get a significant financial results and greater share in the financial market if 
they have not CEO duality (Brown and Caylor 2009). (Abor 2007) indicate the positive and significant 
association between CEO duality and leverage. On the other hand, it was found that CEO duality is 
negatively associated with leverage, and CEO duality force to a firm to utilize its equity instead of debt 
(Bokpin and Arko 2009). (Butt and Hasan 2009) was also described that there is no significant and positive 
association between CEO duality and corporate financing behavior. Moreover, (Bokpin and Arko 2009) also 
suggested that CEO duality is not important indicator of corporate governance for the choice of financing 
Mix. CEO duality is also negatively correlated with capital structure (Ahmed Sheikh and Wang 2012). CEO 
duality helps in retaining a suitable and significant level of working capital in the firm (Gill, 2012). 
(Butt and Hasan 2009) found the negative and insignificant correlation between Managerial shareholding 
and debt to equity ratio. (Su and He 2012) the state ownership and firm efficiency is negatively correlated 
while public and employee share ownership is positively correlated with the firm efficiency. There are 
different kinds of ownership structure due to variances in shareholder’s cultural background. These 
shareholders may be  
(1) Financial 
(2) Non-financial 
(3) Domestic 
(4) Foreign  
The ownership concentration indicates to the ownership of shares, right power and authority in few hands. 
Such ownership concentration may be family or specific institutions. Su and He mentioned significant 
connection between ownership concentration and firm efficiency(Su and He 2012). Moreover, more 
concentrated companies give their devotion to raising capital and wealth; they do not focus on 
transparency and disclosure which may lead to the bad corporate governance practices. The influence of 
ownership concentration has also significant effect on the debt ratio of company. A company ownership is 
held by the outside shareholders as well as management. Managers work for their own concern and to line 
up their interest with interest of shareholders.  
Family ownership means the shares are held by the minor children, spouse, or any nominated person of 
the director. Presently, most of studies have mentioned that family firms do well or non-family firms. The 
family ownership also helpful in controlling of expropriation of shareholders rights but corporation must not 
be entirely owned by family ownership. Non-family firm s is associated less profitability and performance as 
compared to active family control firms (Margaritis and Psillaki 2010), while (Barontini and Caprio 2006) 
explore that non-family-controlled corporations are not statistically different from family firms in terms 
performance. The ownership of shares held by the other companies, financial institutions and Non-financial 
institutions creates a positive influence on company ownership structure. Institutional shares holding has 
positive impact on company performance as declare by (Butt and Hasan 2009). In addition, (Su and He 
2012) mention that the ownership structure and financial decision have positive relationship.  
(Klein 2002) mentioned that the firm transparency and disclosure lead to the company high performance. 
The sub index of transparency and disclosure have shown positive link with financial performance (Durnev 
and Kim 2005). The disclosure of Corporate Governance practices and related rules and regulations are 
necessary to gain the shareholders confidence. It put the pressure on management through corporate 
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governance mechanism which leads the better investor’s relation. So it is necessary by the corporate 
governance code 2012 that the disclosure of CG practice must be report in the annual report of a firm. 
Clash between the managers and shareholders are the reason of agency problems. Obviously, conflict 
between principal and agent arises when management use its executive powers for their own interests. It is 
the responsibility of the management to work in the best interest of shareholders (principal) and as well as 
of firm. (Jensen and Murphy 1989) have found that the significant relationship between the compensation 
committee and board remuneration. (Ahmed Sheikh and Wang 2012)  declared that director remuneration 
motivates the managers that will work towards the increment of investor’s wealth. Moreover, the empirical 
results show the inverse association between director remuneration and capital structure. (Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz 2011) mentioned that the positive relationship board compensation and risk-taking during the 
recent crisis. 
The core board of director’s of a firm formulates a committee to help in creating transparent and trustworthy 
financial results. The committee members review the financial statements annually, six-monthly and 
quarterly basis. The purpose of this committee is to assure’s the benefit of investors, banks and 
stakeholders. Such committee is known as the audit committee. (Lin and Chang 2012) has found the 
positive association with firm’s performance. The empirical results shown that inconclusive relationship 
between the audits related governance and financial performance (Gill and Biger 2013). 
Capital Structure is the mixture of long term debt and short term debt. (Saeed, Gull et al. 2013) indicate that 
it is very difficult to make capital structure decision of any organization. Capital structure creates the way 
through which a company makes financial decisions by combining the equity capital and mixture of short 
and long term debt to control its overall operations (Frank and Goyal 2009). Capital structure size differs 
from company to company due to different characteristics such as company growth, profitability, company 
size, asset structure, sales, company risk and working capital management planning (El-Masry, Al-Najjar et 
al. 2008). (Pratheepkanth 2011) indicate that the capital structure and firm’s financial performance has 
positive relationship, whereas (Frank and Goyal 2009) declare that the capital mix and firm performance 
has negative and significant relationship. 
Financial Performance indicates that how well an organization can use its financial resource and shows its 
financial health and fitness. It also indicates about the outcomes of a company’s works, operations, policies 
and these outcomes shown in the firm’s as return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), return on 
investment, Dividend per share (DPS) and earnings per share (EPS) etc. Literature shows a strong and 
significant association between Capital mix and financial performance. (El-Sayed Ebaid 2009) declare the 
negative and significant affiliation between capital mix and firm performance for Indian firms. While 
(Pratheepkanth 2011) argue that the capital structure and firm’s performance has statistically significant 
and positive relationship. Corporate Governance practices also have great effect on Financial 
Performance. (Munisi and Randøy 2013) indicate the progressive relationship between Corporate 
Governance index and firm performance. 
There are four main perspectives have been explored by the scholars, these perceptions and perspectives 
are known as main approaches of financial performance (Azeem Qureshi 2007). 
 Resource based approach 
 Financial management approach 
 Substantial growth approach 
 Capital structure approach 
ROA is used to estimate the effectiveness of resources used by the company for the creation of profit. 
Capital structure and Return on Assets (ROA) have negatively associated with each other (Pratheepkanth, 
2011). This measure of accounting base performance indicate the earnings of a firm by using its funds 
(Bonn, Yoshikawa et al. 2004). The prime objective of a company is to produce profits and increase the 
shareholders wealth. The return on equity (ROE) is used for the measurement that how much profit is 
generated by the firm capital (Epps and Cereola 2008). It indicate about the management efficiency by 
using the shareholders wealth. 
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The company characteristics i.e. capital structure and corporate governance practices affect a company’s 
financial performance in different ways. However there are different variables like as company size, risk 
and growth those can affect the company performance. These variables are known as control variables. A 
company has a number of control variables.The variable sales growth is treated as a proxy for firm growth, 
because this may affect the firm corporate governance practices and financial performance (Black, 2006a). 
Abor mentioned that risk is calculated as the variability of EBIT (Abor, 2007). Moreover, that, firm s with 
more degree of business risk have more probability of financial performance. 
Research and Methodology 
This study is designed to get the empirical evidence on relationship between the Corporate Governance, 
Capital Structure and Financial performance. Multiple regression method is used under fixed effect model 
approach on panel data to scrutinize the moderating impact of Corporate Governance (CG) on the 
association between Capital Structure and Financial Performance.  
Sample & Variables 
The total number of listed firms in manufacturing sectors are 378 with 14 sub-sectors, varies from 3 to 54 in 
different sectors, with the exception of textile sectors having 181 firms. Those firms are selected as sample 
which were doing business during the whole period of study and complete data for the period of 2009-14 
which reduced the final sample to 173 manufacturing firms. Moreover, the firms neither have been delisted 
by the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) nor merged with any other firm. So, the required secondary data has 
acquired from the annual reports of the listed manufacturing firms on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). 
Conceptual / Theoretical Framework 
General  
 
MODEL 1 
  
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(DV) 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
INDEX (MODERATING 
VARIABLE) 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
(IV) 
ROA  
(Return on Assets) 
Capital 
Structure 
(IV) ROE  
(Return on Equity) 
H0. 1 
H0. 2 
H0. 3 
H0. 4 
H0. 5 H0. 
6 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
INDEX (MODERATING 
VARIABLE) 
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MODEL 2 
 
Research Hypotheses 
To scrutinize the moderating influence of Corporate Governance Practices index on the association 
between firm performance and Capital Structure, following hypotheses are investigate in this study. 
Table 1: Research Hypothesis 
Sr.No. Hypothesis 
Ho.1 There is no significant and positive association between leverage levels and firm performance ROA 
Ho.2 There is no significant and positive association between leverage levels and firm performance ROE 
Ho.3 There is no significant and positive association between CGI and firm performance ROA 
Ho.4 There is no significant and positive association between CGI and firm performance ROE 
Ho.5 There is no significant and positive association between corporate governance characteristics and firm 
performance ROA and leverage levels. 
Ho.6 There is no positive association between corporate governance characteristics and firm performance ROE 
and leverage levels. 
Ho.7 There is no significant and positive association between Board structure index and firm ROA 
Ho.8 There is no positive relationship between ownership structure index and firm ROA 
Ho.9 There is no significant and positive relationship between Transparency & Disclosure structure index and firm 
ROA 
Ho.10 There is no positive relationship between Board structure index and firm ROE 
Ho.11 There is no significant and positive relationship between ownership structure index and firm ROE 
Ho.12 There is no positive relationship between Transparency & Disclosure structure index and firm ROE 
 
 
 
 
BOARD STRUCTURE 
(SUB INDEX-1) 
OWNERSHIPS STRUCTURE 
(SUB INDEX-II) 
DİSCLOSURE & TRANSPARENCY 
(SUB INDEX-III) 
 
ROA  
(Return on Assets) 
ROE  
(Return on Equity) 
H0. 7 
H0. 10 
H0. 8 
H0. 11 
H0. 
H0. 9 
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Operationalization of Variables 
 
Table 2: Operational Definition and Abbreviations of Variables 
Variables Measurements Abbrevi-ations References 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (Capital Structure) 
Capital Structure LTD / Total Assets CAPS 
(Ebaid, 2014) , (Arshad Hasan, 2009), 
(Abor, 2007), (Godfred A. Bokpin, 
2007) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (Financial Performance) 
Return on Assets 
Net Income before tax / 
Total assets 
ROA 
(Ebaid, 2014), (Shagufta Nasreen and 
Farida Khanam, 2014), (Gibson Munisi, 
2012), (Abor, 2007), (Finkelstein, 
1994). 
Return on Equity 
Net Income before tax/ 
Total Equity 
ROE 
(Shagufta Nasreen and Farida 
Khanam, 2014),(Ebaid, 2014) (Gibson 
Munisi, 2012), (Abor, 2007), 
(Finkelstein, 1994), 
MODERATING VARIABLES (Corporate Governance) 
Corporate 
Governance Index 
Aggregate average 
score of Corporate 
Governance index 
CGI 
(Gibson Munisi, 2012), 
(Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 
2010; Metrick, 2003) 
Board Structure-I 
Aggregate average 
score of sub index I 
board structure 
 
BOD-I 
(Gibson Munisi, 2012), 
(Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 
2010; Metrick, 2003) 
Ownership 
Structure-II 
Aggregate average 
score of sub index II 
ownership structure 
OWN-II 
(Gibson Munisi, 2012), 
(Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 
2010; Metrick, 2003) 
Transparency & 
Disclosure-III 
Aggregate average 
score of sub index III 
disclosure & 
Transparency 
DISCL-III 
(Gibson Munisi, 2012),  
(Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna, 
2010; Metrick, 2003) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Firm Size 
Size of the firm (log of 
total assets) 
SIZE 
(Amarjit S. Gill, 2013), 
(Nadeem Ahmed Sheikh, 2008),  
(Godfred A. Bokpin, 2007) 
Firm Growth Growth in sales for firm GROW 
(Amarjit S. Gill, 2013),(Nadeem Ahmed 
Sheikh, 2008), (Godfred A. Bokpin, 
2007) 
Risk 
Variability of earnings 
for firm 
RISK 
(Amarjit S. Gill, 2013),(Nadeem Ahmed 
Sheikh, 2008), (Godfred A. Bokpin, 
2007) 
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Analysis, Results & Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3: Descriptive Analysis 
Variable 
Descriptive Statistics of DV, IND & Moderating Variables 
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Medium Maximum 
Jarque- 
Bera 
Probability 
CGI 0.5478 0.2042 0.4504 0.5702 1.1118 55353.2 0.0000 
Bod-I 0.8830 2.1226 5.0000 9.000 14.000 895.232 0.0000 
OWN-ii 0.7412 1.1436 18.5710 76.709 89.569 13986.32 0.0000 
DISCL-III 0.7627 0.4342 59.0600 69.090 87.345 15142.42 0.0000 
INTRM 0.8733 9.7468 1.0000 8.0000 43.000 14352.38 0.0000 
CAPM 0.3077 0.1055 -0.1408 0.1506 0.3897 15572.98 0.0000 
ROA 07778 4.8354 -21.7185 0.4612 22.322 19139.80 0.0000 
ROE 0.7531 0.5156 -0.7400 0.2669 0.4489 54756.70 0.0000 
RISK 0.4372 8.0864 1.0320 8.4400 11.455 3999150 0.0000 
grwt 0.2736 2.8127 2.3023 4.8154 9.0238 444.385 0.0000 
Firm Size 0.1869 1.8641 14.5660 18.217 23.3418 300.023 0.0000 
 
Table 3 Illustrates the summary of the descriptive statistics of the moderating, independent and control 
variables. The table shows the typical directions of variables used in this model. Descriptive results show 
that the score of CGI for the manufacturing sector firms of Pakistan ranges from 0.4504 to 1.1118 with 
mean and median of the firms is 0.5478 and 0.5702. These ratings shows that the manufacturing sector 
firms of Pakistan have a strong compliance of corporate governance practices and control (about 55%) and 
corporate governance possibly improves the corporate governance and decision making process. The 
maximum score for sub index I of board structure is 14.000 with minimum score 05.000 and average score 
is 88% which shows that Pakistani manufacturing firms have strong and effective board control. The 
minimum score of sub index II ownership structure is 18.571, maximum score is 89.569 and mean score is 
74.12% which indicates that manufacturing companies are describe the greater concentration of 
ownerships. 
The sub index III of transparency and disclosure has range of score from 59 to 87.345 and mean score of 
76.270 which indicates that the manufacturing firms do fair disclosure and transparency in the annual 
reports and do compliance with Corporate Governance Code 2012 and SECP rules. 
Regression Analysis 
To check the moderating impact of corporate governance mechanism on the relationship between capital 
structure and financial performance multiple regression model have been used. Control variables i.e. size, 
growth and risk.  
Research for Model (I) 
ROA = β0 + β1 (CAPS ) + β2 (CGI ) + β3(CAPS * CGI ) +β4(CNTL) 
Three hypotheses (Ho1, Ho2, and Ho3) are framed for this model. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Model (I) 
Dependent Variable:               ROA 
Balance Panel Method: 1038 
Period:    2009-2014 
Variables 
Regression Model Results 
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
CAP2 0.291225 2.754028 0.0060 
CGI 0.043946 4.684219 0.0000 
INTRM 0.360599 3.676545 0.0002 
RISK 2.743074 4.069435 0.0001 
GRWT 0.076343 4.612779 0.0000 
ASTTSIZE -0.064124 -5.864157 0.0700 
R-Squared 0.640293   
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.558058   
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.000000   
The regression results in Table 4. Shows that corporate governance Index and capital structure (debt ratio) 
has statistically significant and positive influence on ROA with the coefficients 0.0439 & 0.291 respectively. 
The slop coefficient of interaction term 0.360 indicate that the moderating impact of corporate governance 
Index is also significant and positive impact on ROA as evident from coefficient  and P-value (0.0002). So 
we reject the null-hypothesis. In addition, the control variables risk and growth both are also significant but 
one variable firm size is not significant as P-value 0.070 shown in the Table 4.  
Furthermore, the value of F-statistics shows that test is appropriate and good as the evident from the p-
value (0.000). Coefficient of determination (R-square) value shows that 64% variation in ROA is due to the 
exploratory variable i.e. good corporate governance practices, capital structue. 
Research Model (II)  
ROA = β0 + β1 BOD+ β2 OWN+ β3 DISCL+ β4 (CNTL) 
Three hypotheses (Ho7, Ho8, and Ho9) are framed for this model. 
Table 5: Estimation Results for ROA 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Variables 
Regression Model Results 
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
BOD-I 1.32238 3.46543 0.0001 
OWN-II -0.01121 -1.29322 0.0850 
DISCL-III 0.64512 2.32984 0.0006 
RISK 2.74307 4.06943 0.0001 
GRWT 0.05634 7.61277 0.0001 
F.SIZE 0.07335 2.34217 0.0050 
R-Squared 0.55049   
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.65709   
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.00004   
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It has been found that the model is overall a good fit as R-Square is 0.55049 which suggests that 56% 
variation in the dependent variable (ROA) has been explain by the change in exploratory variables, while 
the 44% variation in ROA is due to other factors. Moreover, the F-statistic also shows that the fitness of test 
is good as evident from P-value .00004.  
The fixed effect regression result shows that the sub-indices of Corporate Governance Practices i.e. board 
structure (BOD-I) and disclosure and transparency (DISCl-III) both has positive and statistically significant 
relationship with ROA as the coefficient values 1.32238 & 0.64512 shown respectively. However, the sub 
index of ownership structure (OWN-II) has not significant association with the financial performance as P-
value of this index is 0.085. 
In last, the control variables risk, growth and firm size all are also statistically significant relationship with 
explained variable’s ROA as evident from P-value and t-statistic. 
  
Research Model (I) 
ROE= β0 + β1 (CAPS) + β2 (CGI ) + β3(CAPS * CGI ) + β4(CNTL) 
Three hypotheses (Ho2, Ho4, and Ho6) are framed for this model. 
                                     Table 6: Empirical Results for Model (I) 
Dependent Variable:               ROE 
Balance Panel Method: 1038 
Period:    2009-2014 
Variables 
Regression Model Results 
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
CAP2 0.43551 3.28914 0.0000 
CGI 0.65471 2.09176 0.0000 
INTRM 0.01225 3.15832 0.0050 
RISK 0.10214 3.34098 0.0051 
GRWT -0.07421 -1.612779 0.0600 
ASTTSIZE 0.14221 4.34654 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.47093   
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.60202   
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.00020   
 
The regression results in Table 6 shows that corporate governance Index and capital structure (debt ratio) 
has positive and statistically significant influence on ROA with the coefficients 0.65471 & 0.43551 
respectively. The slop coefficient of interaction term 0.01225 indicate that the moderating impact of 
corporate governance Index is also significant and positive impact on ROA as evident from coefficient and 
P-value (0.0050). So we reject the null-hypothesis. In addition, the control variables risk and firm size both 
are also significant but one variable growth firm is not significant as P-value 0.06 shown in the Table 6.  
Furthermore, the value of F-statistics indicates that test is appropriate and good. Coefficient of 
determination (R-square) value shows that 47% variation in dependent variable i.e. firm performance is as 
a result of the good governance practices, capital structure and intraction of of CGI  
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Research Model (II) 
ROE = β0 + β1 BOD+ β2 OWN+ β3 DISCL+ β4 (CNTL) 
Three hypotheses (Ho10, Ho11, and Ho12) are framed for this model. 
Table 7: Empirical Results for Model (II) 
Dependent Variable: ROE 
Variables 
Regression Model Results 
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
BOD-I 0.253286 3.46543 0.0001 
OWN-II -0.233280 -1.44322 0.0760 
DISCL-III -0.140120 -4.32984 0.0906 
RISK 0.102143 2.09220 0.0001 
GRWT 0.074212 3.69234 0.0000 
ASTTSIZE 0.345221 2.84092 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.590931   
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.692051   
Prob(F-Statistic) 0.000001   
 
The empirical result shoes that the model is overall a good fit as  
R-Square is 0.590931 which indicate that 59% variation in the dependent variable (ROE) has been explain 
by the variation in exploratory variables, while about 40% variation in dependent (ROE) is due to other 
factors. Moreover, the F-statistic also shows that test is appropriate and good as evident from P-value 
.000001.  
The regression result shows that the sub-indices of Corporate Governance Practices, board structure 
(BOD-I) has statistically significant and positive relationship with ROA as the coefficient values 0.25328 
shown in the table. However, the sub index of ownership structure (OWN-II) and disclosure and 
transparency (DISCL-III) both have not significant association with the financial performance as P-value of 
this index is 0.0760 and 0.0906 respectively. 
In last, the control variables risk, growth and firm size all are also statistically significant relationship with 
explained variable’s ROE as evident from P-value and t-statistic.                   
Conclusions 
The empirical results of this stipulate that, the Corporate Governance Practices Index (CGI) is statistically 
significant and positively linked with firm accounting base financial performance. The empirical results  also 
specify that the inclusion of Corporate Governance Index (CGI) as moderating variable has influenced the 
interaction between Capital Structure and financial performance, which is positively significant, that 
indicate, manufacturing sector firms are performing well due to the implementation and focus on Corporate 
Governance Practices, which provides the opportunity to firms to use of good and optimal level of capital 
structure, which leads to the better financial performance. 
Moreover, the results also disclose that Pakistani listed manufacturing firms is characterize with large board 
size, implementation of independent board structure, separation of chairman and CEO, proportion of 
Executive and non-Executive Director and effectiveness of board with larger size. However, the ownership 
structure has not positively and significantly associated with firm performance, because, the most of 
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Pakistani manufacturing firm’s ownership is in few hands or describe as family control business that lead to 
weak law enforcement and inequality in ownership structure and disproportion shareholders controlling 
power. So the result identify that, there must be a balance between the structures of ownership and 
shareholders controlling power. The transparency and disclosure is also positively linked to the firm 
performance but due to lack of resources, awareness and inefficiency of Pakistani manufacturing firms are 
incapable to show the full and fair disclosure in their financial statements. 
So, it is recommended that the SECP (Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan) introduce the new 
reforms in the Internal and External Mechanism of Corporate Governance Code 2012.  
The range and scope of this study is limited to the sample of Pakistan Manufacturing firms. The sample 
selection is only limited to the non-financial of Pakistan sector while the financial sector is ignored. 
Furthermore, sample size is small and comprised on 173 firms only. The decision criteria is based on 
secondary data (past data) while the present and expected data for future has been overlooked.  
Finally, the study is based on the development of corporate Governance index which is depend upon 
internal mechanism. The external mechanism like as laws related to market operations, merger and 
acquisition and takeover has been ignored.  
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